The popular opinion if one is to believe the mainstream media and various talking heads is that Australia has missed the worst of the GFC and the future looks bright as Australia gravitates back towards ‘normal’ growth levels. The unseen opinion is that Australia is on the precipice of a debt deflation period, which will mean a protracted bout of reduced consumption and higher unemployment as the country works to pay down debt.
Australia is unusual in the respect that it is one of the few housing bubbles in the western world that is yet to pop. The increase in the First Home Owners Grant (FHOG) in October of 2008 provided a massive boost to the housing industry which was showing signs of buckling. With the FHOG tripling from 7k to 21k for new home builders the extra 14k for a deposit would allow someone to borrow an extra 140k given a Loan to Value Ratio (LVR) of 90%. Obviously this increased the scope for credit and gave home buyers much more flexibility in terms of their offer price for houses. In terms of policy there would be few that could offer so much bang for the buck, as a result of credit creation a dollar of government money was causing an effect of many multiples on the economy. It is no surprise that 2009 was one of the best years on record in terms of house price increase.
The following graph clearly illustrates that owner occupied housing credit growth was slowing rapidly from the start of 2007 and that reduction quickly stopped upon the introduction of the FHOG at the end of 2008 which quickly sent credit growth back to 10% per annum. The grant finished at the end of 2009, this graph has figures up to the end of 2009. It will be interesting to see what happens from here but my guess is that the trend will begin again and credit growth will approach zero before turning negative over the next year or two. The recent move by Westpac to reduce the LVR to 87% is a worrying sign that banks will now begin to severely limit the amount they are prepared to loan to those seeking to buy homes. The reduction of LVR from 95% to 87% effectively halves the amount someone can borrow given a designated deposit. This will have a depressive effect on house prices if it spreads to the other big banks.

From: http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/xls/d02hist.xls
Why do I anticipate the shrinkage of housing credit? My argument throughout this article is that Australia has reached peak credit and sits on the precipice ready to reduce debt. This will come at a big price because Australia has become dependent on a good proportion of its consumption expenditure being financed by increased credit. When credit begins to be paid down rather than increased then all consumption driven by credit is wiped out.
So has credit really peaked? The ratio of debt to disposable income has been rising dramatically since the early 1990s. However, it seems to have reached its peak at just under 160%, this most likely indicates that Australians have reached their limit where the debt is too overwhelming.

From: http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/xls/b21hist.xls
If total credit in the economy is examined it can be observed from the following graph that after a rapid climb the level of credit has plateued, mainly at this stage due to a decrease in the amount of business credit in the economy.

From: http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/xls/d02hist.xls
Indeed, the whole credit market has changed dramatically in Australia in recent decades. Business lending used to dominate the scene with a 60% share at the beginning of the 1990s it now represents less than 40% of the credit market. This share has been eroded by household credit, both investor and owner occupied which together have grown from a 25% share in 1990 to a 50% share now. This is clearly a massive structural change. We have gone from an economy which uses most of its credit to attempt to create, manufacture and provide services to an economy which uses most of its credit to buy and sell houses.

From: http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/xls/d02hist.xls
If the total credit figures are given as an annualised growth rate things become a little clearer. If you observe the following graph it shows clearly a big fall in the growth rate of total credit during the last recession in the early 1990s, it can clearly be seen that a similar event is happening now. Please let me divert for a second though, if it is good enough for important economic statistics such as GDP and CPI to be represented by annualised growth figure why do the ABS fail to represent other statistics in the same way?

From: http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/xls/d02hist.xls
Business Credit in Crisis
Business credit in Australia is now undergoing a firestorm. It is over 10% down off its peak in November 2008. Many reports indicate that credit for business loans has dried up substantially from banks. This does not represent as big a problem for big business because they have the ability to raise capital through shareholders. For small business though this is a much bigger problem as they do not have that option.
Tougher lending standards have been implemented by banks towards business loans over the last two years. In 2009 commercial property sales decreased by a staggering 30% as REITS abandoned the market. The average capital value of industrial properties has fallen 25% from peaks of two years ago. There is bad news everywhere.
This is the worst drop in business credit in recorded history. As the following graph demonstrates, annualised growth in business credit has fallen off a cliff into unprecedented levels.

http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/xls/d02hist.xls
Coinciding almost perfectly with the drop in business credit has been a significant drop in the Producer Price Index (PPI) which is a cost index of all the inputs needed to run a business. In other words, many of the items paid for by business credit to produce items and provide services make up the PPI. The lack of credit and the consequent effects on business demand have had a deflationary effect on the PPI. After about a 6-9 month lag the big reduction in business credit has fed into the PPI figures. As the following graph shows this movement is once again unprecedented.

From: http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/xls/g03hist.xls
Deflation is Upon Us: Over the Cliff We Go
Every argument needs a kicker and I have left it till last. The classic sign of deflation is not as many people think, negative CPI numbers. The CPI is a very much imperfect measure of prices in an economy. Products and services change so quickly that the CPI measure becomes more irrelevant with every passing year.
There is one thing you can measure with certainty though. That is the amount of money in the economy. The broad measure of money M3 is a widely recognised measure for economists, but for Joe on the street it means very little. In very simple terms it is the total amount of money available in an economy at a certain point in time.
While I am no monetarist I still think M3 is a powerful indicator of deflation if it decreases.
What we have basically had over the last decade is large growth in M3 with very little inflation. In the old days if M3 was growing rapidly it would be accompanied by inflation. Recently we have seen very strong growth in M3 with no inflationary effect. So what made up the difference? Something for further study. One thing is for sure though, when M3 goes backwards the economy goes backwards.
So before we go on lets look at M3 over the years in aggregate. Nothing really stands out except the precipituous growth in the last decade. There is a little blip downwards there at the end, but it looks harmless enough, right?

From: http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/xls/d03hist.xls
If we once again annualise the growth rates what is really happening can be revealed. Well so what you say, looks like a recession may be the worst thing that might happen, after all look at what happened in the early 1990s recession. There were falls in M3 over this time, in fact over 1991 to 1993 there were eight monthly occurences of falls in M3, all were individual except for two which were concurrent in October and and November of 1991.
The big deal is that at the moment we have had four months in a row of a decrease in M3. In the records going back to 1965, this has never happened before. It is unprecedented.
An outlier?
One would hope so.
My bet though is that it is the start of a new trend. One that will see the M3 do something it will not have done on living memory. Decrease, year on year.
If the current trend continues then annualised M3 growth will be in negative territory by April. Just to be safe I am going to call negative annualised growth for M3 before July 2010.

From: http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/xls/d03hist.xls
If you think there is nothing to worry about consider the following article. This was just before the massive impact of the GFC and the still ongoing incredible effects on the United States economy.

From: http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2008/08/m3-contraction-future-is-now.html
If you still think M3 doesn’t matter check out the graph from shadowstats detailing their estimate for M3 over time.

Everything went pear-shaped in the United States precisely after M3 started to decrease. Is Australia at the precipice, ready to fall. Only time will tell of course, but given factors such as our massive debt, housing bubble, collapsing business credit and unprecedented fall in M3 already I think the time is now. Australia, you are standing in it.
M3 Inflation and Ireland: Deflation Sets In
Having constructed an M3 inflation measure for Australia over the last several decades the picture is one that if put to the average joe on the street would much more accord with how they ‘feel’ inflation in their everyday lives. The measure for Australia shows much higher levels of inflation over the last decade and also several short periods of deflation in the two decades before that.
This is still only a thought bubble with no peer review as yet, I am an academic economist with an honours degree, a PhD and some publications in econimics, but currently non-practising. I can come up with these ideas free from the constraints many non-orthodox economists must deal with on a day to day basis.
So the thought bubble will be expanded to Ireland. Basically the same methodology, annual growth in M3 minus short term bank interbank interest rates (90 days). With the monetary unification of the European Union the classic measures of M3 for each member country became obsolete overnight. However, Ireland has constructed it’s own measure of M3. The measure is known as the Irish contribution to the equivalent euro-area aggregate M3.
The Iriish Central Bank put a great deal of thought into how a new measure for M3 could be constructed given the financial implication of the Maastricht treaty. The following document is one example, http://www.centralbank.ie/data/QrtBullFiles/2003%2003%20Money%20Supply%20in%20Ireland.pdf.
So let us cut to the chase and have a look at M3 Inflation in Ireland. The following graph clearly show that with my measure of M3 Inflation, Ireland lurched into a sever period of deflation in 2008 and has slowly been clawing back ever since. The deflation rate plunged to levels of 15% .
Source: Data compiled from http://www.centralbank.ie/frame_main.asp?pg=sta_late.asp&nv=sta_nav.asp
So what is the story for Australia? As this blog has explained in earlier posts, the deflation episode for Australia is yet to happen. For comparisons sake I constructed a graph of each countries M3 Inflation over the same period from 2004. The good news for Australia from this graph is that the inflationary period does not seem to be anywhere near as severe as what happened in Ireland. One would assume that the resulting deflation may not be as severe as well. To repeat the often quoted copout line, only time will tell.
Source: Data compiled from http://www.centralbank.ie/frame_main.asp?pg=sta_late.asp&nv=sta_nav.asp and http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/index.html